What Were The Terms Of The Anglo-German Naval Agreement Signed In 1935

(a) The 35:100 report is a lasting relationship, i.e. the total tonnage of the German fleet must never exceed 35% of the total tonnage of the naval forces of the members of the Commonwealth of Nations of the United Kingdom, as defined in the Treaty, or, if so in the future, there are no contractual restrictions on members of the Commonwealth of British Nations. However, it would be wrong to blame the other person responsible for the appetite fiasco at the Conservatives` door, for it was clearly the prevailing concern of the time. When the Prime Minister announced the extension of the RAF in response to Hitler`s assertion that he had achieved parity with Britain in April 1935, Attlee replied that our policy [The Labour Party] was not to seek security through rearmament, but by disarmament. Our goal is to reduce weapons, then completely eliminate all national armaments and create an international police force within the League. As an additional offence to France, the naval pact was signed on the 120th anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo, in which British and Prussian troops defeated Napoleon`s French army. By asking the Navy to divide its tonnage by 35% by class of warships, the Germans were forced to build a symmetrical shipbuilding programme of the “balanced fleet” that reflects the priorities of the United Kingdom. [25] Given that Royal Navy leaders believed that the “balanced fleet” would be the easiest German fleet to defeat and that a German guerrilla fleet was the most dangerous, the agreement brought considerable strategic benefits to the United Kingdom. [49] Especially since the Royal Navy did not build “pocket boatmen,” Chatfield appreciated the end of the armoured ship building. [49] The reason for the British government`s agreement with Germany was the belief that it was better to have an agreed limitation of German rearmament than to have unlimited rearmament. But this reasoning was strongly condemned, notably by Winston Churchill, who said that on 27 March 1935, Hitler had appointed Joachim von Ribbentrop to head the German delegation to negotiate a naval contract. [37] Von Ribbentrop served both as Hitler`s extraordinary ambassador – plenipotentiary to Large (as part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and as head of an NSDAP organization called Ribbentrop, which competed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Baron Konstantin von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, initially objected, but changed his mind when he decided that the United Kingdom would never accept the 35:100 report; With Ribbentrop in mind, the mission was the best way to discredit his rival.

[38] In 1938, the only use the Germans had for the agreement was to threaten to give up pressure on London to accept continental Europe as Germany`s legitimate sphere of influence. [57] At a meeting on 16 April 1938 between Sir Nevile Henderson, the United Kingdom`s ambassador to Germany, and Hermann Goering, he stated that this had never been appreciated in England, and he bitterly regretted that Mr. Hitler had never accepted it at the time without getting anything in return.